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TRUSTS - ACCUMULATION OF INCOME - Testator left his estate in
trust until twenty-one years after the death of two nieces, the trust income to be
used :first to pay several annuities and the remainder "to be re-invested by the
trustee for the increase and benefit of this trust fund." At the expiration of twenty-one years after the death of both nieces the trust was to terminate and the estate
to be distributed. The lower court held1 that, while the trust did not violate the
rule against perpetuities nor the District of Columbia statute as to the suspension
of the power of alienation, the trust income could not be. accumulated for so
long a period. Held, reversed. Under common law of the United States and
the District of Columbia a provision for the accumulation of income of a trust
is permitted for a period of twenty-one years after lives in being; any change
in this rule is for the legislature, not the courts. Gertman 'll. Burdick, (App.
D. C. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 924.2
Not infrequently trusts which provide for the accumulation of income for a
long period of time involve contingent future interests which may not vest
within lives in being and twenty-one years; thus the interests are void under
the common-law rule against perpetuities. If, however, the future interests are
vested, or are certain to vest, within the period of the rule against perpetuities,
the question is then squarely presented whether there is any rule, other than the
rule against perpetuities, which restricts the creation of trusts for the accumulation of income.8 More than a century ago, in the case of Thellusson '/J. Wood!ord,4 the English House of Lords held that a trust for accumulation of income
for a period short of lives in being and twenty-one years was good. But Parliament promptly enacted legislation substantially reducing the period of permissible accumulation. 6 The lower court in the principal case appears to be the
Burdick v. Burdick, (D. C. D. C. 1941) 33 F. Supp. 921.
opinion of the lower court is noted in 40 CoL. L. REv. 1430 ( I 940) ;
29 GEORGETOWN L. REv. 392 (1940); 54 HARV. L. REv. 834 (1941); 6 Mo. L.
REV. III (1941); 14 So. CAIJ. L. REv. 183 (1941). The opinipn of the appellate
court is noted in 36 lLL. L. REv. 567 (1942). The Supreme Court of the United
States denied certiorari on March 30, 1942. Burdick v. Burdick, (U. S. 1942) 62
S. Ct. 917.
8,If the interest in question is vested, the rule against perpetuities is commonly
considered inapplicable. GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., § 322 (1915);
KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §§ 658, 660, 737 (1920).
4 II Ves. Jr. 112 at 145, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805) which involved a trust to
accumulate income for lives of nine living persons. The court said: "If the law is so
as to postponing alienation, another question arises out of this will which is a pure
question of equity: whether a testator can direct the rents and profits to be accumulated
for that period, during which he may direct that the title shall not vest, and the
property shall remain unalienable; and, that he can do so, is most clear law." It is apparent that this case did not decide what the rule would be if the beneficial interests
had vested but the trust was to last for a period in excess of lives in .being and 21
1

2 The

years.
5 The Thelluson Act, 40 Geo. III, c. 98 ( I 800), which limited trust accumulation. However, in view of the doctrine of Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. II5, 49 Eng.
Rep. 282, Cr. & Ph. 240, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841), and the case of Wharton v.
Masterman, [1895] App. Cas. (H. L.) 186, it would appear that the present rule in
England is that if no statute is violated and the beneficial interest is vested, a trust
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first to hold that, as a matter of common law, a provision for accumulation for
a period short of lives in being and twenty-one years is bad. 6 While it recognized
that the English common law was otherwise, and that the Thellusson Act, 1
which restricted accumulations in England, was no part of the common law of
the District of Columbia, nevertheless it held that the English common law, so
far as it allowed accumulations of large sums of money in testamentary trusts
for a long period of time, is repugnant to American conditions and principles
of democracy. 8 The appellate court, in reversing this decision, approved the
English common-law doctrine, and suggested some of the questions which the
courts would have to answer if the position of the court below were to be maintained. Where, it was asked, should the court find a standard to determine the
length of the period of permissible accumulations? What limit should be set on
the amount of the accumulation? Should the standard apply to realty as well as
to personalty? When a period is found, what should be the consequences of
exceeding it? What exceptions should be made? It would seem that, entirely
aside from any questions of policy, the practical difficulties in applying a judgemade rule to restrict accumulations to a period shorter than that of the rule
against perpetuities are very considerable. Moreover, the legislative experience of
jurisdictions which· have enacted statutes limiting trusts for accumulation tQ a
shorter period does not clearly indicate the desirability of such restriction.9 One
important question is left unanswered by the decision of the appellate court in
the principal case: Is there any rule other than the rule against perpetuities which
restricts accumulations of income to the period of lives in being and twenty-one
might be allowed to accumulate for a period longer than lives in being and 21 years
if the beneficiary did not destroy the trust. See 2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 589
(1936).
6 This court, in setting aside the accumulation provision, did not say that all provisions of that kind would be void or that if made in a reasonable time they would be
upheld. Compare earlier opinion of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
in King v. Shelton, 36 App. D. C. I (1910), affirmed Shelton v. King, 229 U. S.
90, 33 S. Ct. 686 (1913).
7 See note 5, supra.
8 33 F. Supp. at p. 928 the court said: "Public interest and welfare forbid that a
dead hand from the past should shape and control the present except so far as permitted by law. Permitting unreasonable restraints on alienation are [sic] inconsistent
with the principles of democracy. They are the concomitants of an aristocracy. Such
restraints are relics of a feudal society, are obsolete and are repugnant to our institions and conditions."
9 See Simes, "Statutory Restrictions on the Accumulation of Income," 7 UNIV.
CH1. L. REv. 409 .( 1940). The following statutes have changed the common law rule
on accumulations: Ala. Code (1940), tit. 47, §§ 146-147; Ariz. Code Ann. (1929),
§§ 71-118, 71-120; Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941), §§ 724-726; 111. Rev. Stat.
(Bar ed., 1941), c. 30, § 153; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), §§ 51-102, 51-103;
Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), §§ 12956-12960; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), §§ 80668070; Mont. Rev. Code (1935), §§ 6709-6713, 6715; N. Y. Consol. Laws (McK.inney, 1938), tit. 40, Personal Property Law, §§ 16-17, tit. 49, Real Property
Law, §§ 61-63; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913), §§ 5290-5294, 5296; Pa. Stat.
Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1941), tit. 20, §§ 3251, 3252; S. D. Code (1939), §§ 51.0301
to 51.0307; Wis. Stat. (1939), §§ 230.36 to 230.40.
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ye?,l"s? 10 That is to say, if all interests involved in a trust for accumulation are
certain to vest within lives in being and twenty-one years, but the trust and the
accumulations may continue for a longer period, would any rule of law strike
dowl} the provisions of the trust? In this country, where indestructible trusts are
recognized under the doctrine of Claflin v. Claftin,11 it would seem that there
are peculiar reasons for such a rule. It has been said that trusts which remain
indestructible for a period longer than lives in being and twenty-one years are
not permitted.12 Doubtless a trust for the accumulation of income is one kind
of indestructible trust, and thus is subject to the rules restricting such trusts.
The precise character of the rules restricting indestructible trusts, however, has
yet to be determined by the courts.13
lames L. McCrystal
. 10 The courts seem to say that trusts cannot accumulate income beyond lives in
being and 21 years. Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321, 29 S. Ct. 106 (1909). Here the
settlor wanted his estate put in trust for as long as legally possible, and the trust income
to accumulate. The Court, after holding that the trust was indestructible for lives
in being and 21 years, said, "We think the surplus ..• must accumulate as part of the
trust estate until the time arrives for the distribution of that estate.•••" 211 •U. S.
321 at 334. In Hoadley v. Beardsley, 89 Conn. 270, 93 A. 535 (1915), the court
held that "trusts for accumulation must be strictly confined within the limits of the
rule against perpetuities and if such trust exceeds those limits it is void." See also
Wilson v. D'Atro, 109 Conn. 563, 145 A. 161 (1929); Lewis Oyster Co. v. West,
93 Conn. 518, 107 A. 138 (1919); Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen (92 Mass.) 1 (1865);
Pelton v. First Savings & Trust Co., 98 Fla. 748, 124 So. 169 (1929) (a direction to
accumulate without any time limit was held invalid). But see Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo.
583, 46 S. W. (2d) 135 (1932); Hanna, "Some Legal Aspects of Life lnsuranc~
Trusts," 78 -UNIV. PA. L. REv. 346 (1930). In Moeller v. Kautz, 112 Conn. 481,
152 A. 886 (1931), the court says that the general rule of accumulations is limited
to lives in being and 21 years, but that it might find an accumulation unreasonable if
the situation arose. l BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 650 (1935): "If they [accumulating provisions] are useless, wasteful, and arbitrary, the courts may refuse to enforce
them even though the period and beneficiaries are satisfactory." See also, l TRUSTS
RESTATEMENT, § 62, Comment 1 (1935).
11 Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454 (1889), where an active trust
was held indestructible at the wish of the ccstui, even though he was under no disability
and had an absolute and indefeasible interest. See also: Shelton v. King, 229 U. S. 90,
33 S. Ct. 686 (1913); In re Estate of Yates, 170 Cal. 254, 149 P. 555 (1915);
DeLadson v. Crawford, 93 Conn. 402, 106 A. 326 (1919); Wallace v. Foxwell, 250
Ill. 616, 95 N. E. 985 (1911); Matter, of Hamburger's Will, 185 Wis. 270, 201
N. W. 267 (1924). See also 37 A. L. R. 1420 (1925).
12 KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., § 737 (1920); Clark, "Unenforcible
Trusts and the Rule against Perpetuities," lo MICH. L. REv. 3 l ( l 9 l l) ; Warren,
"Progress of the Law: Estates and Future Interests," 34 HARV. L. REv. 639 (1921);
Scott, "Control of Property by the Dead," 65 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 632 (1917). It has
even been proposed that "it would be unimportant whether we say there are two
separate rules or two subdivisions of the same rule." 2 S1MEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 432
(1936).
18 When the accumulation is to last beyond the rule for indestructible trusts, three
solutions seem possible: (1) The whole trust may be void. l BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES, §§ 215, 218 (1935); 2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 589 (1936);
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Cleary, "Indestructible Testamentary Trusts," 43 YALE L. J. 393 (1932). (2) The
provision for indestructibility may be held ineffective and the entire trust and accumulation made terminable by the beneficiary. Van Epps v. Arbuckle, 332 Ill. 551, 164
N. E. l (1928). (3) The trust.may continue with an accumulation valid for the
period of indestructibility and then terminable on the option of the beneficiary. Hussey
v. Sargent, II6 Ky. 53, 75 S. W. 211 (1903); BOGERT, supra, § 215. See also
Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N. H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1894), where the court used the same
reasoning in a case of remoteness of vesting. It has been held that in such a case the
accumulation for the period of indestructibility passed by intestacy and the trust was
otherwise valid. Wilson v. D'Atro, 109 Conn. 563, 145 A. 161 (1929).
In limiting the alienability interests under the rule of the Claflin case, the authorities who agree that lives in being and twenty-one years should be the limit do not agree
on the question when the period time should start. In GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., § 121.8 (1942), it is argued that the period should start from
the beginning of the future interest. Prof. Kales, "Vested Gifts to a Class and the Rule
against Perpetuities," 19 HARV. L. REv. 598 at 604 (1906), and "Several Problems
of Gray's Rule against Perpetuities, Second Edition," 20 HARV. L. REV. 192 at 202
(1907), takes the view that the period should begin on the death of the testator. See
also TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 62, Comment K (1935).

